Baidoa Falls and Federal Power Prevails
Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.
Last week, with federally-backed forces bearing down on Baidoa, Laftagareen accelerated his electoral process to just a matter of days, securing his 're-election' with a substantial majority. Though opposition politicians within the Leysan and other influential Digil-Mirifle sub-clans had urged presidential elections since Laftagareen's term expired in December 2022, there was little chance of political alternation on 28 March. Instead, the incumbent leader secured 66 votes, with his closest rival-- Abdullahi Haji Hassan-- receiving just 13. But in the end, Laftagareen served just two days of his second term.
Laftagareen's re-election did not stay the arm of the federal government; anything but. It had been clear for some time that conflict for Baidoa was imminent, as Turkish drones, arms and men —including, concerningly, US-trained Danab forces —continued to pour towards Baidoa. Militias drawn from key sub-clans of the Rahanweyne, including the Hadame and the Leysan, had also been mobilised in Burhukaba, with Laftagareen's broad unpopularity leaving him struggling to rally pan-clan resistance against Mogadishu. After four years of toeing Villa Somalia's line, his pledge of support for the 2012 Provisional Constitution failed to convince many, just as the federal government's claims that Laftagareen was aligning himself with Al-Shabaab and that his presidency was illegitimate were dubious. Federal ministers —including Turkish surrogate and Ports Minister Abdulkadir Nur 'Jama' —are now celebrating Laftagareen's ousting. Jama in particular has emerged in recent days as a possible Turkish-backed contender for the South West presidency, as Ankara looks to solidify its political stakes across south-central Somalia beyond Mogadishu. Other images of Livestock Minister Hassan Eelay — another notable opponent of Laftagareen — revelling with his militia in Baidoa have circulated as well.
The Ministry of Defence and state media are pushing the justification of Laftagareen's removal as part of broader counter-terrorism operations, asserting that they were ambushed by South West forces while conducting anti-Al-Shabaab clearance operations near Baidoa. There, too, has been a particular emphasis on the reopening of the long-closed Mogadishu-Baidoa road. Such parallels to late 2024 —when Mogadishu similarly sought to oust Ahmed Madoobe from Kismaayo after he abandoned the government's electoral agenda —are unmistakable. And yet, the events of the past days have again painfully revealed that the war against Al-Shabaab is far more a battle of wills rather than capacity, with the federal government rallying thousands of fighters and armaments to eject a Federal Member State leader-- not the jihadists.
Mounting pressure on Villa Somalia did nothing to avert the federal president's course, with the AU, UN, IGAD, and EU--as well as a handful of European nations--urging rapid de-escalation. Rather, the only foreign weight in this latest conflict has been drawn from the Turks. Before its overthrow today, the South West administration had alleged that, alongside Turkish-trained Haram'ad paramilitaries and Gorgor troops, Villa Somalia had wielded armed Bayraktar drones, a clear sign of the increasingly forthright role that Ankara's hardware is having on the Somali political context.
In a retort to the advancing forces, Laftagareen had warned yesterday that "any attack on Baidoa or the wider South West State territory would trigger a strong military response." In reality, though, the regional president had already lost much of his region to federally-aligned militias, with Baraawe, Huddur, Burhakaba and Qansadheere having all fallen in quick succession. And yet, such is the way of Somali politics, Laftagareen needed only control Baidoa to assert his authority as South West president. Rhetoric from Laftagareen —clad in military fatigues —and his allies had stirred memories of the 1990s and the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA), when Digil-Mirifle forces rose up to eject the occupying Hawiye militias from Bay and Bakool. But in the end, little of that mattered in the face of the weight of a Turkish-backed Mogadishu-driven offensive.
The role of the Ethiopians is currently unclear, with some reports suggesting that the federal forces have bypassed the airport and presidential palace where the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) is stationed. While the Ethiopian military had deployed substantial numbers of soldiers and armoured vehicles into Baidoa in recent days, it appears the ENDF refrained from intervening on behalf of Laftagareen. For PM Abiy Ahmed, wrestling with domestic insecurity and other regional matters, supporting Laftagareen over his relationship with Mogadishu was not a hill he was seemingly willing to die on. And the ENDF's supposed 'red line' of zero fighting in Baidoa ultimately failed to stall the advance of federal forces. At the time of writing, Laftagareen and some of his cabinet have relocated to Ethiopian protection at the airport.
Villa Somalia has succeeded in ousting a Federal Member State president. And to what end? By expelling Laftagareen, Villa Somalia has effectively cemented any plans for a parallel process-- and possible government-- in early April led by the Council for the Future of Somalia (CFS), confirming the bifurcation (or trifurcation, including Somaliland) of the Somali state. This morning, though, also sent a dire warning to the leaders of Hirshabelle and Galmudug —the last elected leaders within Villa Somalia's camp —if they commit to defection.
Hassan Sheikh has prevailed over Laftagareen, and Baidoa is now his to command. If any further confirmation was needed that this president has no intention of relinquishing his grip on power in the months to come, this morning was surely it. But he may have won the state at the cost of the nation, securing his position as president as popular support for Villa Somalia dwindles ever more. Much of the Darood, Rahanweyne, Isaaq, and Hawiye, not to mention the persistently overlooked minority communities, feel increasingly alienated from this government. And the political fallout of a Hawiye president effectively seizing the city of majority Rahanweyne will reverberate for some time to come, with Al-Shabaab waiting in the wings. Much of south-central Somalia still effectively resembles a handful of city-states encircled by a sea of Al-Shabaab, with the jihadists feeding off the discontent and grievances of, among others, the Rahanweyne. Baidoa may have been conquered, and Laftagareen ejected, but in trading a rival for a city, Villa Somalia has buried any pretence of federalism and validated opposition accusations of dictatorship. And the deeper contest—for legitimacy and for the state itself—has only been sharpened.
The Somali Wire Team
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