Setbacks on Three Fronts Signal Big Risks for Somalia’s Federal Government
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
It was the second such setback in as many days for the FGS. A day earlier, fighters aligned with the former president of South West State (SWS), Abdiaziz Hassan Laftagareen entered the town of Qansaxdheere in the Bay region, about 75 kilometres west of Baidoa, without encountering any resistance. The local Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) garrison made no effort to prevent the takeover. Qansaxdheere is the only major town to fall under Laftagareen’s control since he was deposed in a staged parliamentary putsch, backed by federal troops, in March this year. Fighting has since convulsed the regional capital, Baidoa, several times and residents continue to flee their homes in anticipation of renewed clashes.
A week earlier, a peace conference at Maxaas, in eastern Hiiraan region, had concluded with a landmark agreement between a cross-section of Hawaadle elders and Al-Shabaab. Although the agreement has been rejected by some Hawaadle political figures as illegitimate and unrepresentative of the clan’s collective position, the conference was nevertheless noteworthy in several respects. First, the location: Maxaas has frequently been used as a staging area from which to conduct offensives against the militants; convening the talks there suggested that it may no longer be used for this purpose, leaving Al-Shabaab in effective control of much of the region. A 16-point declaration circulated by websites and social media aligned with Al-Shabaab included a cessation of hostilities and the prohibition of any support to Ma’awiisleeye militias engaged in hostilities against Al-Shabaab. The presence at the conference of Al-Shabaab’s Wali, or shadow governor, for Hiiraan region, together with several other Hawaadle notables from the movement – suggested a rare degree of candour and confidence that they either would not, or could not, subsequently be targeted by federal security forces.
Each of these developments is of local, rather than national importance. But they are all symptomatic of political and institutional dysfunction at the federal level: Villa Somalia’s self-defeating determination to exercise direct political control over each and every Federal Member State (FMS); the loss of momentum in the FGS’s war against Al-Shabaab, and deep uncertainties about its capacity to sustain that fight as African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) commences its withdrawal; and the persistent frailty of state institutions, including the Somali National Army (SNA), despite billions of dollars of assistance over the past three decades.
Recent events in Gedo and Bay regions are the latest twists and turns in HSM’s long, single-minded campaign to replace FMS presidents he considers insufficiently loyal with his own appointees – by force if necessary. Villa Somalia’s clumsy attempts to destabilise Puntland by raising Majerteen militias badged as federal troops to oppose President Said Abdullahi Deni collapsed in September this year, leaving Deni in an arguably stronger position than before. A disastrous attempt to unseat Jubaland president Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madoobe’ in December 2024 resulted in hundreds of federal troops being routed and fleeing across the border into Kenya. Since then, Villa Somalia has focused on hiving Gedo region away from Jubaland, fuelling several cycles of skirmishing at the border that have at times threatened to drag Ethiopian forces into the fray.
Laftagareen’s firm refusal to accept his ouster as SWS president (he still lays claim to the title and recently appointed a new cabinet-in-exile) has produced several major rounds of fighting inside Baidoa of escalating ferocity – including the use of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on both sides. As sub-clan loyalties shift within the Mirifle, a steady trickle of federal commanders have defected to Laftagareen’s camp and there are credible reports that his forces have entered into a marriage of convenience with local Al-Shabaab units, co-ordinating their assaults on the city.
In contrast with Bay region, the Hawaadle clan’s flirtation with Al-Shabaab is driven not by HSM’s removal of a Hirshabelle leader but rather by his plan to keep President Ali Abdillahi Gudlaawe in power for another term. The delicate balance between Abgaal and Hawaadle interests in Hirshabelle requires intricate power-sharing arrangements that include a rotation of posts and privileges between the two clans. Given that the Abgaal have possessed both the state capital, Jowhar, and the presidency since Gudlaawe took office, the Hawaadle harbour reasonable expectations that one of their own should accede to the top office. HSM’s designation of Gudlaawe as his Justice and Solidarity Party’s candidate for the Hirshabelle presidency has predictably ignited Hawaadle indignation. This perceived affront compounds Hawaadle grievances about the FGS’s attempts to wrest control of the Ma’awiisleeye’s gruelling campaign against Al-Shabaab in eastern Hiiraan between 2022 and 2024, and to take credit for any gains, without providing adequate support. Naturally, Al-Shabaab is the principal beneficiary of such internecine quarrels.
Recent incidents might be dismissed as annoyances if Somalia’s broader political and security canvas were more positive. But the federal military offensive against Al-Shabaab has effectively stalled since August last year, when a joint SNA-UPDF operation recaptured several ‘bridge towns’ in Lower Shabelle – towns that have changed hands multiple times since 2014. Despite claiming to have degraded the militants with raids and drone strikes, Somali military reporting describes Al-Shabaab as maintaining a sustained operational posture across all fronts of the conflict and increasing pressure in several key areas – including some suburbs of Mogadishu.
The situation is expected to deteriorate as AUSSOM forces prepare to draw down in late 2026 and early 2027, handing over some 47 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to the SNA – one of which, incongruously, is Qansaxdheere. Villa Somalia’s reaction to this dilemma has been to protest that it no longer needs the help of foreign troops, while privately insisting that anything less than an 18-24 month extension of AUSSOM’s mandate beyond December 2026 is unacceptable. A letter issued by the American government last month, granting United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) 12-month extension to wind down its operations, has served to muddy the waters even further; the US has previously rejected any additional funding for UNSOS beyond the end of this year and the letter is unclear whether the extension includes any new operational funding, or merely the disbursement of remaining balances for the purposes of liquidation and closure. Clarity may not be fully forthcoming until a new UN Security Council resolution on AUSSOM and UNSOS is adopted in the last week of December this year.
Last week, HSM stood shoulder to shoulder with the Presidents of Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan at the Egyptian coastal city of New Alamein, where they pledged deeper cooperation on regional and international issues and economic co-operation. None of those nations, however, is a troop contributing country (TCC) to AUSSOM – although Egypt has repeatedly expressed its intention to join the mission. The Somali president may therefore be exploring the feasibility of replacing a waning African Union mission with bilateral support from sympathetic regional partners – all of whom have provided training to various Somali security formations. Such leaders are far less likely to pose difficult questions of the Somali head of state, as President Museveni of Uganda did at a July 2026 summit of AUSSOM partners in Entebbe, pointedly telling HSM to get his politics in order. The Somali president publicly rebuffed him.
If nothing else, recent setbacks in Bay, Gedo, and Hiiraan regions all seem to impart the same lesson: if HSM does not get Somalia’s politics in order, he is not likely to achieve anything else either.
